I have spent my day in a forum dedicated to the security of classified information. Individuals attending are facility security officers, defense security service employees, and others caught in the orbit of U.S. Government classified information. One of the speakers made a comment that made me immediately jump to post something on Twitter: "I want you to walk away from this presentation with one thing you can do to prevent risk." <- I don't think you understand risk. — Peter Hesse (@pmhesse) March 14, 2014 Why did I say that the esteemed gentlemen who was presenting didn’t understand risk? Let’s break it down. The Definition of Risk Risk can be either a noun or a verb. Consider these definitions found[…]
In light of the recent Epsilon data breach, it seems appropriate to chat briefly about the realities of balancing information risk. First and foremost, we need to make sure that we understand this thing called “risk.” In our context, risk is defined as “the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss” (based on Jack Jones’ FAIR definition). Put into practical terms, risk is the likelihood that we’ll experience a negative event. We then balance that out against the cost of defending against various scenarios (i.e., trying to reduce or transfer that risk), with the goal being to optimize cost vs. benefit. Let’s look at a couple practical examples.
Unless you’ve been living under a rock for the past week, then you undoubtedly know that Japan was rocked a few days ago by an 8.9 magnitude earthquake (the 3rd largest in the past decade and top 10 overall – also check out the NYT’s before & after shots) and a subsequent tsunami that exponentially compounded the ill effects of the disaster. Coming out of that incident, one of the most hyped “news” items has been the aftermath at the Fukushima nuclear power generation facility. It turns out (unsurprisingly) that much of this coverage has been faulty, inappropriately throwing around talk of “melt downs” when, in fact, things are under control. For a great, detailed description of the entire incident,[…]
News flash: Those so-called “risk” labels/ratings included in pentest and vuln scan reports are NOT actually “risk” representations. I was in attendance at the OWASP Summit 2011 a couple weeks back, and the topic of “risk metrics” and labels came up during one session. As a result, I led a break-out session on what risk really looks like in the macro sense, in accordance with formal methods, and where these various scan/test results really fit in. The session had great conversation and highlighted for me a need to expand risk analysis training to a broader audience. Below is a picture of the taxonomy of factors that make up a FAIR (Factor Analysis of Information Risk) risk analysis. Putting aside the[…]
There has been much criticism of risk assessment and analysis over the past few years that amount to much ado about nothing. Why is it much ado about nothing? Well, because, quite simply, people oftentimes don’t understand what it is they’re criticizing, especially in the case of quantified risk analysis methods. Before we get into risk measurement, let’s first make one thing clear: risk analysis is nothing more than a decision-analysis (or decision-support) tool. It helps provide reasonably accurate data points that decision-makers can use when make decisions. It is not a panacea for all things risk or infosec, nor is it some sort of special magic-sauce voodoo with no grounding in reality (at least not in terms of well-considered[…]
Risk assessment gets a bad rap these days, thanks in large part to a checkered past colored by qualitative analyses. Historically, risk assessments have been fuzzy, at best, and down-right inaccurate and misleading at worst. You know the ones I’m talking about: some hot shot consultant comes in, pokes around, maybe runs a couple scans, and then churns out a report with a bunch of High, Medium, and Low findings. However, as you dig into the results – particularly the so-called “High Risk” findings – you start finding extreme squishiness with no connection to reality, rational thought, or logic. And this is what we’re supposed to use to “better manage” security? Don’t think so… Enter Factor Analysis of Information Risk[…]