For a while now, CAPICOM has been declared deprecated by Microsoft, as it is only implemented in 32-bit, with no plans to roll out a 64-bit version. Microsoft’s Official Recommendation for replacing CAPICOM is to “use the .NET Framework to implement security features”. This is a fine solution for desktop applications, server-side code, web services, and a whole host of other applications. However, there doesn’t seem to be any equivalent support for the functionality the CAPICOM ActiveX control enables within a browser. The client platform Microsoft wants you to use to run client code in the Browser is Silverlight, a browser add-on similar to Flash or ActiveX. Silverlight uses many of the .NET APIs; however, the support for the System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates[…]
For starters, let me just say that I personally have three Mac systems and three Windows systems I interact with on a regular basis. I’m writing this blog post from a Macbook Pro. However, there is a wide and growing misconception about the security of Mac systems vs. the security of Windows systems. I just came across the following post in PC Magazine’s Security Watch blog, and there is a lot of good information in there; specifically the following quote which I want to share: In the abstract, Macs are every bit as vulnerable as Windows systems, perhaps more so. But in the real world Mac malware is so rare that it actually makes news. Hundreds of Windows trojans like OpinionSpy[…]
The FTC has once again delayed enforcement of the FACTA Red Flag Rules, this time to Dec. 31st, 2010.
In celebration of Facebook’s recent privacy control revamp, I present a very informative tutorial video from the Electronic Frontier Foundation that gives a brief rundown of the changes, the highs, and the lows. This might also be something beneficial to share with friends or relatives on Facebook who may not be in-the-know about the increased focus on privacy control in social networking and social media. Enjoy:
I’m greatly amused. In 2008, former Gartner analyst Richard Stiennon said that NAC was worthless (see “Don’t even bother investing in Network Admission Control“). In a face-to-face debate on the topic a couple months later, Joel Snyder allegedly defeated Stiennon on the topic (and quite handily, if you agree with the account by then-NAC-vendor-CTO Alan Shimel). It’s interesting, then, that 2 years later Snyder has come out and basically declared the NAC market a complete mess and not really worth the cost. Said Stiennon in 2008: “Put it this way: Can you secure your network without NAC? Yes. Does NAC in anyway reduce your overall costs? No. Does NAC tie you down to one vendor’s eco-system? Yes, if you go[…]
Lately, Google has been apologizing for mistakenly collecting data from unprotected Wi-Fi networks with the fleet of vans the company has sent out for its StreetView service. Some have pointed out that, by leaving their wireless networks unprotected, companies had no reason to expect their data would not be collected somehow. And so we have another example of what can happen when data and communications are left unprotected. You’re even susceptible to accidental disclosure of information. What other accidents might occur? One thing that comes to mind is accidental loss of bandwidth. Someone who doesn’t know any better might turn on their laptop and find that they have Internet access. What they didn’t realize is that they automatically connected to[…]