Last week, we received a fax at the office from a branch of Virginia Commerce Bank. It was addressed to “Katie” and had our fax number clearly written on the cover sheet. The cover sheet had this interesting quote:

This facsimile, which may contain confidential or legally privileged information, is intended for the use of the individual to whom it is addressed only. If you are not the intended recipient (or authorized delegate for the recipient) of this message, please telephone the number listed above to advise us, so that we can arrange for its proper destruction and resend it to the correct recipient. Thank you.

It probably goes without saying that there isn’t a “Katie” working here at Gemini (yet). So of course we called the number to let them know we had received this fax in error. It took my office manager over 30 minutes on the phone to get through to the appropriate person to ensure that it was understood that the information went to the wrong fax number. We followed their instructions explicitly, but nobody at the bank seemed to know what to do. Ultimately it wasted our time.

What was in the fax? The materials attached were an absolute treasure trove of information. Names, addresses, phone numbers, birth dates, social security numbers, drivers license numbers… and that was just on the first page. A copy of two driver’s licenses. A copy of two credit cards. A letter of incorporation, a federal EIN, and copies of two credit reports.

This is more than enough information to steal the identity of two individuals and one business. And the terrifying part of it is that nobody would have been the wiser if we didn’t take the time to phone the bank to let them know we had received the information in error.

Which brings up an interesting question. Should we have called the bank? Sure, I feel bad for the individuals and the business who are having their most private information sent via fax. Their information couldn’t be in better hands though – we know better than to do anything with this information, and we securely shredded it. On the other hand, because we called them the bank now has a record that they accidentally sent us this information. If these individuals suffer identity theft, wouldn’t they immediately consider us a suspect?

In these days of heightened concern about identity theft, why are banks still using insecure transport mechanisms such as faxes without even bothering to call the recipients to ensure successful delivery?

Although we’ve made many posts about the importance of password security, have you ever wondered just how long it would take for a well-equipped attacker (having access to clusters or supercomputers) to brute force your password? Or how much more protection you gain from adding some special characters?

If you’re not inclined to crank out the numbers yourself, you might find the answers you’re looking for here.

Here are some basic stats:

• With access to super-computing-like power (trying over 1 billion per second), it only takes about 84 days to crack the common 8 character password (alphanumeric mixed case, including special characters).
• With access to a less powerful class of attack machines (10k per second), without including special symbols, an 8 character mixed-case alphanumeric password would need 692 years to brute force completely.
• Numeric-only passwords are low-hanging fruit.

The data only takes into account the maximum time it would take to brute force a password by exhausting the key space. It does not include tricks or techniques someone might use to optimize an attack. The most significant factor in the success of this approach is the use of the hardware. The price, availability, and power of hardware have a direct bearing on the protection offered by the typical single-factor password authentication scheme. In addition, as technology improves, the barrier to entry for brute forcing will drop, potentially allowing more would-be attackers to try their hand at it. Also, botnets dedicated to brute forcing passwords will get faster as the hosts (typically infected PCs) that comprise their processing power become faster. The golden standard “8 character alphanumeric+special” password is already within reach of a well-funded attacker (and has been for a while).

If you haven’t already, it may be time to start picking longer passwords for important accounts.

I received the following email on Monday morning:

You don’t know me.  I’m nobody.  My name is Steve.  I came across a database dump from Gawker.com earlier this evening.  It’s making its rounds around the internet.  Besides just the code dump from gawker.com among other sites, it also contains email addresses and passwords for over 1.3 million accounts.  I’m sending this email to the 200,000 or so people who’s passwords were included, in plain text, in this archive.  I have your password.  However, I have 0 interest in it.  Obviously i’m anonymous so how can you trust me – you can’t.  But trust me, if I had interest in your password, I wouldn’t be emailing you saying I have it. That’s just dumb.  The reason I’m telling you this is because people all over the world, who aren’t like me, who won’t notify you, have it.  They will use and abuse it.  Change your gawker.com credentials. Now.  MORE IMPORTANTLY, change passwords on other sites you visit that use the same one as your gawker.com/lifehacker.com/gizmodo.com login.

Well, it was believable enough… then, I read an article on Forbes and knew it wasn’t a scam. Argh. To their credit, Gawker has some informative posts on their breach and how to audit and update passwords.

As background: I use a password manager to manage my passwords, and it helps me use secure passwords wherever possible. However, I have a number of passwords which predate my use of a password manager, and for many sites I used the same password. Yes, it’s a bad security practice that we’ve talked about before, and even XKCD has weighed in.  The use of this same password didn’t bother me – it was my password for using on sites that I considered “low impact”. In other words, I didn’t feel like it was a big deal if that password was compromised.

Receiving that email, along with a notification from Google that my account had been locked out, was a wakeup call. Suddenly, it became a big deal to me.

So, I spent this evening going through my password manager’s records. I have 507 saved passwords.  I had nearly 150 with the same password.  I changed every one of them to a randomly generated password.  It took me over three hours to go through that process.  A tremendous hassle. Let me suggest from experience: change those passwords you use on many sites.  If you try to do them all at the same time, it will be a tiring and painful process.

Researchers have developed a method (pdf) by which they are able to record the sound of a dot matrix printer in operation and recreate the information that was printed based on the audio data. Data leakage from electronic devices isn’t new (TEMPEST comes to mind). However, it seems like the higher-profile methods tend to encompass electromagnetic properties rather than mechanical properties.

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Chances are, if you read 10 articles or blog posts about the 2010 RSA conference, you will hear the term “cloud computing” ten times. The cloud was clearly the dominant theme of most of the presentations, product demonstrations, and discussions which took place at the Moscone Center in the first week of March 2010. However, another theme was nearly equally present in presentations and discussions: Cybercrime.

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Today Slashdot had a story about how a news story about an Australian transportation plan was broken early by a newspaper. The transport minister said the access of this information was akin to the newspaper trying to “pick the lock off a secure office and take highly confidential documents”.  What was the brilliant security plan that was supposed to be protecting this information?  The information was all stored on an unpublished URL with no security or authentication in place.

We in the security industry call this “security by obscurity“.  And it is not security at all. (more…)

When companies create security policies designed to keep their information secure, they are often most focused upon the threat of an outsider.  Certain measures, like using secure protocols such as SSL and TLS, or using S/MIME encrypted email can help keep your information from being viewed by third parties when it is sent over untrusted networks.  Other measures, like performing hard disk encryption on your laptops help keep your information secure when a laptop is lost or stolen, or a hard drive is sold on eBay.  None of these measures will help in the scenario of a trusted insider getting access to over 1300 documents that they have no business having.

According to the complaint, Jhaveri admitted being employed by Bristol-Myers-Squibb as a Technical Operations Associate from November of 2007 until his termination on February 2, 2010. The complaint further alleges that during his employment, Jhaveri stole numerous trade secrets as part of a plan to establish a pharmaceutical firm in his native India which would compete with Bristol-Myers-Squibb in various markets around the world.

How do you protect against the insider threat?  It is one of the more complicated issues of information security and there are a lot of opinions on how to deal with it.  Certainly it has to start with understanding what information you have which needs to be protected, how damaging that information could be if it were to be lost/stolen, and then making some cost/benefit analysis decisions on the best ways to protect it.  Everything from a rights management services type of solution to a strong security event and information management (SEIM) system could be useful in preventing and detecting insider threats.

Recently, Imperva released a study (pdf) of the passwords extracted from the December 2009 RockYou security breach that resulted in the compromise of over 32 million user accounts. This study examined some statistics of the passwords retrieved, including the number and variation of characters use to construct them. The results were pretty bad. Here are the highlights:

-30% of users had passwords made up of 6 characters or less. Most brute force attempts are moderately successful against short passwords.

-Over 50% of passwords were all lowercase, or all numbers. This is bad because the keyspace is reduced. Even a password that is longer than 6 characters is weakened if it has a small character set distribution.

On the surface, these two statistics aren’t a good look at all, especially considering the ease with which an attacker could successfully guess simple passwords.

Also, in many cases, a password breach may not just make a user’s account vulnerable on the breached site, but can also lead to their account being compromised on other sites as well (plenty of people use the same password on multiple sites).

However, there is an alternative way to interpret this data. Although there is no way to verify this, it could be the case that users are starting to give value to the importance of some accounts AND the security of the website associated with it. And those accounts that are of low significance (like a site they just sign up on to play a game) get simple, easy-to-remember passwords, while accounts of greater personal significance (banks, primary email, etc.) get the more robust passwords. Similarly, it could be the case that users think sites like RockYou are sketchy anyway, and thus more likely to get hacked than other more-serious sites.

So, in a way, the user could be protecting themselves from a site breach. I know I wouldn’t care if I had a RockYou account and the site got breached since I wouldn’t really use that same password anywhere else important. It may be annoying, but it is much better than knowing that my super-secret 28-character password is sitting on some stranger’s computer simply because somebody left the door open.

So if you think of this report from the perspective of users managing risks reasonably instead of users being victimized, it almost makes sense that 29,000 people had ’123456′ as a password.

According to a new article on TechTarget, a study by the Ponemon Institute has revealed the cost of a data breach has increased once again, to $204 per compromised record. The study is available for download at http://www.encryptionreports.com/ after giving away some personal details.

The “Fifth Annual U.S. Cost of Data Breach Study,” funded in part by encryption vendor PGP Corp., determines the annual cost of the breach by establishing a company’s cost of lost business as a result of an incident; expenses incurred by notifying individuals and authorities of a breach; costs associated with legal fees and consulting firms and new investments made in technology and employee education.

In our down economy, it is interesting that the cost of data breaches have been rising for five years running.  If I were cynical, I might suggest that one of the reasons for the constantly increasing costs in this study is the partnership with PGP, who sells products designed to protect you in the case of a lost laptop or storage device.

That said, I’m not even sure that those items above can accurately represent the cost of data breaches, especially in certain environments.  The loss or damage of reputation caused by a data breach can be so devastating that the monetary cost can’t even be calculated.  If you don’t know what I’m talking about, what is the first thing that comes to your mind when I mention Heartland Payment Systems, TJX, or the Department of Veterans Affairs?  These organizations have suffered tremendously because of wide (and widely publicized) data breaches.  Imagine the firestorm of criticism if some of the most trusted companies were to suffer data breaches along the lines of Heartland’s breach?

In addition to the loss of reputation, what are other costs of data breaches that the Ponemon study doesn’t reveal? Let us know in the comments.

Google has just announced that HTTPS access would be “on by default” starting immediately. This is in response to the recently publicized attacks against Google and Gmail which are causing Google to reconsider their approach to China.

While I’m happy that Google will now be encrypting Gmail-related communication by default, I’m a little surprised and disheartened that it took an attack to cause this to be implemented. Sure, https has been an option since July of 2008, but Google had previously warned of a security / usability tradeoff with turning it on:

Because the downside is that https can make your mail slower. Your computer has to do extra work to decrypt all that data, and encrypted data doesn’t travel across the internet as efficiently as unencrypted data. That’s why we leave the choice up to you.

Today’s computers are fast enough to handle https without concern, thank you very much. And I think they meant to say your encrypted email “can’t be cached by proxy servers” instead of “doesn’t travel across the internet as efficiently” – which is a good thing, right? The use of always-on-HTTPS is an infrastructure problem – establishing and maintaining all those different secure sessions with different keys certainly takes time and processing power. It is unfair to solve your infrastructure problem by suggesting that the user might not want comprehensive security.

Are you aware of any other services that allow the user to make a poor security decision in the (perhaps unjustified) name of speedier access? Let us know in the comments!