<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: The End Of Paper</title>
	<atom:link href="http://securitymusings.com/article/1711/the-end-of-paper/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://securitymusings.com/article/1711/the-end-of-paper</link>
	<description>Rants and raves from information security professionals</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 19 May 2012 23:32:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: David</title>
		<link>http://securitymusings.com/article/1711/the-end-of-paper/comment-page-1#comment-29175</link>
		<dc:creator>David</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 22:08:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitymusings.com/article/1711/the-end-of-paper#comment-29175</guid>
		<description>Well, I&#039;d presume will #1 was judged to be valid, if not the latest. We certainly accept signatures, and have for ages. But some niggling points:
* Was it witnessed?
* Can those signatures be attested to today?
* Can the decedant&#039;s signature, or those of any witnesses, be compared against other documents? (especially if any of those are witnessed / notarized themselves)

Will 2: Technically, that one sucks. Not sure I&#039;d trust it, since there are no controls and nobody else has attested to it. OTOH, how likely is it that Stanford (the new beneficiary) has forged this? What does &quot;everything seems to be in order with this signature&quot; mean? (the hash was valid?)

Will 3: I&#039;d reject that right out, as the sole beneficiary is also the sole controller of the signature process. Simply can&#039;t be trusted. 


So, as a juror, I&#039;d vote for #1, and against #2 and #3. None of them is really trustable, but if you start to question wet-ink signatures, then everything collapses like a house of cards. But I agree, simply having three conflicting wills, of questionable authenticity, probably guarantees probate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, I&#8217;d presume will #1 was judged to be valid, if not the latest. We certainly accept signatures, and have for ages. But some niggling points:<br />
* Was it witnessed?<br />
* Can those signatures be attested to today?<br />
* Can the decedant&#8217;s signature, or those of any witnesses, be compared against other documents? (especially if any of those are witnessed / notarized themselves)</p>
<p>Will 2: Technically, that one sucks. Not sure I&#8217;d trust it, since there are no controls and nobody else has attested to it. OTOH, how likely is it that Stanford (the new beneficiary) has forged this? What does &#8220;everything seems to be in order with this signature&#8221; mean? (the hash was valid?)</p>
<p>Will 3: I&#8217;d reject that right out, as the sole beneficiary is also the sole controller of the signature process. Simply can&#8217;t be trusted. </p>
<p>So, as a juror, I&#8217;d vote for #1, and against #2 and #3. None of them is really trustable, but if you start to question wet-ink signatures, then everything collapses like a house of cards. But I agree, simply having three conflicting wills, of questionable authenticity, probably guarantees probate.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

